This article examines the interaction between the demand for deductible insurance and the demand for the asset that can be insured. A model where the decision-maker can choose both the insurance level and the amount of the risky asset to hold in the portfolio is used. Allowing simultaneous determination of the demand for an asset and the level of the deductible alters the comparative statics of demand for both the deductible level and for the asset. This is illustrated by determining the impact of shifts in nonrandom initial wealth, the price of the risky asset, and the price of insurance.
INTRODUCTION
In general, decision-makers are concerned with the overall level of risk, and for this reason, the decision to acquire a risky asset or to undertake a risky venture, and the decision to insure that asset or venture, are inter-related decisions. The decision to insure depends on the nature of the risky asset, but it is also the case that the desired quantity of the risky asset depends on insurance availability and cost. For example, the decision to purchase an automobile with particular price and other characteristics, in part, depends on the differing costs of insuring the various vehicles. Similarly, a doctor or other professional's choice of field of specialization may depend on the availability and cost of malpractice insurance in the various fields.
This research addresses this interaction between the demand for insurance and the demand for the asset that can be insured. Attention is focused on the deductible form of indemnification because of the considerable interest in this form of insurance. This interest is due in part to the common occurrence of a deductible provision in insurance contracts, and also because the deductible form of an insurance contract is known to be optimal under a wide variety of circumstances. Arrow (1971 Arrow ( , 1974 , Raviv (1979) , and Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) are among those who demonstrate the optimality of the deductible form for Donald J. Meyer is an Associate Professor of Economics at Western Michigan University. Jack Meyer is a Professor of Economics at Michigan State University. The authors wish to thank three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
insurance. Others, including Schlesinger (1981) , Demers and Demers (1991) , Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (1991) , and Schlee (1995) , examine the impact that various parameter shifts have on the demand for deductible insurance. In their analysis only the insurance purchase decision is considered.
The main set of results demonstrated here concern shifts in parameters and how these changes affect the choice of deductible level. The findings are presented for the more general portfolio context noted above. Eeckhoudt, Meyer, and Ormiston (EMO) (1997) conduct a similar investigation, but do not consider this same deductible insurance case. EMO employ a general form for the indemnification function, but do not consider the choice among alternatives with differing deductible levels. Instead, EMO model the insurance demand decision as one where the insured chooses the proportion of the loss to indemnify, and not the indemnification functions characteristics. Their work does demonstrate that when the demand for insurance and the demand to hold a risky asset interact, parameter shifts can have an impact which is quite different from that when no interaction between the decisions is possible. This finding is extended here to the case of deductible insurance where the level of the deductible is selected by the insured.
It is important to note that both here and in EMO, the risks associated with ownership of the various units of the risky asset are perfectly correlated; that is, each unit of the risky asset purchased is subject to the identical loss. An example of this might be insurance such as hurricane insurance where the insured may choose coverage for a number of homes or other structures in the same location. The other extreme, where the risks across the risky assets are independently distributed rather than perfectly correlated has also been investigated. Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Levasseur (1993) , for example, investigate the conditions under which the addition of independent and identically distributed risks affect the quantity of insurance demanded. A typical application of their analysis would include questions such as whether enlarging a fleet of vehicles changes the optimal amount of coverage per vehicle.
When selecting the level of insurance of any form, a parameter is used to denote or identify the quantity or level of insurance. For coinsurance this parameter is typically the coinsurance level, and for insurance contracts with deductibles, the magnitude of the deductible is commonly used. Recently, Meyer and Ormiston (1998) indicate that using the level of expected indemnification rather than the magnitude of the deductible to denote the quantity of insurance in a deductible insurance contract has advantages, and these advantages prove useful in this work as well. Because the magnitude of the deductible and the level of expected indemnification are related to one another in a one to one manner, using the latter to denote the quantity of insurance does not affect or limit the generality of the analysis that is conducted. An important reason for making this change is that this allows one to state and verify the second order condition for maximization of expected utility, which in turn allows standard comparative static analysis to be carried out.
Analysis of decision models with more than one choice variable is inherently more complex, and frequently allows fewer predictions, than similar analysis of models with a single choice variable. This work shows that the nature of the interaction between the risky asset and deductible insurance on that asset is such that significant predictions can still be made even in the multiple decision variable setting. Determinant comparative static statements are demonstrated even in the more complex environment. An important step in these demonstrations is showing that with decreasing absolute risk aversion, deductible insurance and the risky asset are complements in terms of preferences; that is, holding more of the one increases the expected marginal utility of the other. The comparative static analysis section of the paper focuses on the effects of shifts in three parameters, the nonrandom initial wealth, the price of the risky asset, and the price of insurance. For changes in initial wealth, it is the case that the demand for both deductible insurance and for the risky asset can increase or decrease, even when assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion. This differs from the standard insurance demand model where under decreasing absolute risk aversion insurance demand must fall with increases in wealth. Furthermore, even though demand for insurance and the holding of the risky asset can increase or decrease as a consequence of wealth increases, it is not the case that total risk can fall. Wealth increases cannot simultaneously lead to increased demand for insurance and also reduced demand for the risky asset. Such a change would reduce total risk to the decision-maker, and can be ruled out under decreasing absolute risk aversion.
The effects of a price increase for the risky asset are determinate and are quite standard. When the price of the risky asset is increased, less of the risky asset is demanded, for both income and substitution effect reasons. In addition, with the complementary relationship between insurance and the risky asset, less insurance is purchased for each unit of the risky asset as well. Consequently the total demand for insurance falls with an increase in the price of the risky asset both because fewer units of the risky asset are held, and also because each unit is insured at a lower level.
The third area of comparative static analysis considers the impact of changing the price schedule for insurance. For price level changes, with decreasing absolute risk aversion the income and substitution effects work in opposite directions. Their magnitudes are compared here only for the case where the price of insurance is proportional to expected indemnification. In addition to price level changes, the effect of a change in the rate at which price adjusts with expected indemnification is also determined. When this slope of the price schedule is also altered, determining the impact on the demand for insurance and for the risky asset is quite complex. In general, the impact of an arbitrary price schedule change depends on the direction and relative magnitudes of the price level and the slope change.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the notation and assumptions used throughout the paper. The demand model where both the quantity of deductible insurance per unit of the risky asset and the number of units of the risky asset are simultaneously selected is presented. The following section indicates how to characterize the expected utility maximizing amounts of the risky asset and its deductible insurance. This is done using expected indemnification rather than the deductible level to denote the quantity of insurance. The penultimate section determines the comparative static effect of changing initial wealth, the price of the risky asset and the price of insurance in this deductible insurance-portfolio framework. The final section contains conclusions and a brief summary.
ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATION
Assume the decision maker is endowed with initial wealth w and allocates that wealth between a risky asset whose purchase price per unit is v, a safe asset whose purchase price and return are one, and deductible insurance for the risky asset. The price of, and return from, the safe asset are normalized for simplicity as the focus of this work is on the risky asset, the deductible insurance on that asset, and the interaction between the two. Each unit of the risky asset has value M when no loss occurs, but is subject to random loss of size x , where x has support in [0, M] and is distributed continuously. The cumulative distribution function describing x is denoted by F(x) and the density function by f(x). The assumption of a continuously distributed random loss variable simplifies notation considerably and is necessary for the differentiability that is assumed.
The decision-maker selects α units of the risky asset where α ≥ 0 is assumed, and also can choose to insure against the random loss. An insurance policy, {I(x), P}, is composed of an indemnification function I(x) providing reimbursement of size I(x) on each unit of the risky asset when loss x occurs, and a price for insurance, P. With insurance, random final wealth, z , is given by:
Deductible insurance has indemnification function I(x) satisfying:
where D is the level of the deductible. Let P = φ(D) denote the price of this deductible insurance as a function of the deductible level. Hence final wealth is given by:
where u(⋅) is the decision-maker's twice continuously differentiable von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. When D and α are selected to maximize U(D, α), it is difficult to state simple restrictions ensuring that the second-order condition for expected utility maximization is met. This same difficulty arises in the demand for deductible insurance model with a fixed level of the risky asset. Schlesinger (1981) gives extensive analysis of this issue. Recently, Meyer and Ormiston (1998) have resolved the second order condition difficulty by reformulating the analysis using an alternate decision variable. This is the approach taken here, and details are given in the next section.
AN INDIRECT METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL DEDUCTIBLE
In this section the decision problem is restated so that the expected level of indemnification, Q, rather than the level of the deductible, D, is the parameter used to denote the quantity or level of insurance. Q is also the variable chosen by the decision-maker. For deductible insurance, expected indemnification is given by:
This function Q(D) is strictly decreasing in D for all values for D such that F(D) < 1, and has an inverse denoted by D = γ(Q). If one determines the EU maximizing level for Q, then γ(Q) can be used to determine the associated EU maximizing value for D. Slope and curvature properties of γ(Q) are obtained using the inverse function rule. It is the case that γ′
is a decreasing and convex function. Because Q is now the parameter denoting the particular deductible insurance contract, price must be expressed as a function of Q as well. Let ψ(Q) denote the price of insurance expressed as a function of Q for deductible insurance policies. Clearly, the two price functions ψ(Q) and φ(D) are related through γ(Q) by ψ(Q) = φ(γ(Q)). This implies that ψ′ = φ′γ′ and ψ ″ = φ′γ″ + φ″(γ′) 2 . It is assumed that ψ(Q) satisfies ψ′(Q) > 1. This implies that the price of insurance rises faster than expected indemnification. It is also assumed that ψ′′(Q) ≥ 0. This assumption is discussed more fully in the context of the second order conditions for this decision problem. Notice, however, that ψ″ ≥ 0 does not translate into a simple restriction concerning φ″. ψ″ ≥ 0 is equivalent to the restriction φ″ ≥ φ′ ⋅f(D)/(F(D)-1) which does not appear to have a simple interpretation.
Using this notation, the decision problem is reformulated so that final wealth depends on expected indemnification Q and is given by:
Let V(Q, α) denote expected utility from final wealth; that is,
where z is now a function of Q and α. For this optimization problem, the first-order conditions are V Q (Q*, α*) = Eu′(z)z Q = 0 and V α (Q*, α*) = Eu′(z)z α = 0, where Q* and α* are the optimal values for the choice variables. These first order condition expressions are given by:
and
The corresponding second-order conditions that are sufficient for the α * and Q * satisfying these restrictions to maximize expected utility are:
The sign restrictions in (3) and (4) also play a large role in comparative static analysis. As was indicated earlier, the similar conditions when D is the variable selected by the decision-maker are not known to hold under any simple assumptions on the decision model. The first task here is to verify these second order conditions. Theorem 1 shows that when price is convex in Q and the decision-maker is risk averse, these second-order conditions are satisfied.
Theorem 1: V(Q, α) is locally strictly concave at Q * and α * if u(⋅) is increasing and strictly concave and ψ(Q) is increasing and convex. Proof: The second-order conditions (3) and (4) must be shown to hold at Q * and α * . First, observe that V αα = Eu″(z)z α 2 , which is less than zero under strict risk aversion. Now V Qα = Eu′′(z)z Q z α + Eu′(z)z Qα = Eu′′(z)z Q z α . This last equality follows from the fact that z Qα is proportional to z Q and hence Eu′(z)z Qα = 0 at Q * and α * . When V QQ is calculated, an additional term arises because of the Q in the limits of integration in the expression for V Q . V QQ can be written as
2 is strictly negative under strict risk aversion. Furthermore, writing out Eu′(z)z QQ + u′(w+α[M-γ-ψ-v])α(γ′) 2 f(γ) yields:
The first term in (5) is negative from the convexity of ψ(Q). Using properties of
, the second portion of (5) The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the assumption that ψ(Q) is a convex function. This restriction is necessary in a perfectly competitive insurance market if expected indemnification is considered to be the product of the insurance provider and price taken as given. In this setting, price then simply reflects the cost of providing insurance. Costs must be convex in order to guarantee a solution to the profit maximization problem. Attempts to prove a similar theorem when D rather than Q is the decision variable would rely on the assumption that price as a function of deductible level, φ(D), satisfies φ′γ″ + φ″(γ′) 2 = ψ′′ > 0, a less convenient or interpretable assumption. Finally, observe that when proportional pricing is assumed, price is convex in expected indemnification. Thus, this convexity assumption is weaker than that common restriction. Moreover, this theorem shows that the second order condition for expected utility maximization is always met with proportional pricing whenever the decision maker is risk averse.
COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS
In this section, the effects on the optimal level for the deductible and holding of the risky asset of shifts in various parameters in the model are determined. The analysis focuses on three specific parameters: the initial level of wealth, the price of the risky asset, and the price of insurance. Shifting each of the first two parameters has an effect which is similar to that reported in EMO for coinsurance and risky assets. Hence those proofs and that discussion is brief. The analysis of the effects of changing the price of insurance, however, is quite different from that done in EMO, and is presented in more detail.
The optimal values for Q* and α* are assumed to be defined by first order equations (1) and (2). The Implicit Function Theorem, applied to these equations, indicates that the effect on the optimal values for Q and α of changing any nonrandom parameter "a" is:
The signs of these expressions are determined by the signs of the numerators because J is positive from the second-order condition. Each numerator in (6) and (7) has two components. The first, referred to as the "indirect effect", results from the interaction between the choice variables. That is, this term reflects the change in insurance demand due to the induced change in portfolio composition, or the change in portfolio composition due to the induced change in the insurance associated with the risky asset, respectively. This component is not present in models when interaction between the portfolio and insurance decisions is not allowed.
The second component in each numerator reflects the "direct effect" of the parameter change. This effect of a parameter shift is in the same direction as it would be when one decision variable is allowed to adjust with the other being held constant. Since this is precisely the analysis conducted in the portfolio model or the insurance demand model, we already know much about the sign of this component from existing analysis. The following lemma indicates the known results concerning the sign of the direct effect for changes in wealth or the price of the risky asset. To state these results, it is convenient to let A(z) ≡ -u″(z)/u′(z) and R(z) ≡ zA(z) denote the Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute and relative risk aversion, respectively.
Lemma 1: V Qw ≤ 0, V Qv ≥ 0, V αv ≤ 0 and V αw ≥ 0 if A(z) is decreasing. Proof: V Qw = Eu″(z)z Q = -EAu′(z)z Q ≤ 0 because A(z) is increasing in x and u′(z)z Q has mean zero and changes sign once from negative to positive as x increases.
By a similar argument, V αw = Eu″(z)z α = -EAu′(z)z α ≥ 0, V Qv = -αEu″(z)z Q ≥ 0, and V αv = -Eu′(z) -αEu″(z)z α ≤ 0. Q.E.D.
This lemma indicates that the direct effects of changes in wealth or the price of the risky asset are in opposite directions for Q and for α. The next lemma shows that V Qα ≥ 0, which indicates that the indirect and direct effects of these parameter changes oppose one another. Consequently, for changes in w or v, the interaction between the decision to insure and to hold the risky asset, can reverse findings in models where this interaction is not considered. For instance, increases in wealth can lead to an increase or a decrease in insurance demand when portfolio effects are taken into account even with decreasing absolute risk aversion(DARA). DARA is known to be sufficient to ensure that insurance demand falls with wealth increases for the case where the quantity of the risky asset is held fixed.
The following lemma indicates that V Qα is nonnegative when the decisionmaker is decreasing absolute risk averse. V Qα ≥ 0 reflects the fact that the marginal expected utility of insurance increases as more of the risky asset is held and vice versa. The term complement in terms of preferences is sometimes used to describe this relationship between insurance and the risky asset being insured. This complementary relation is a local concept, as the proof of Lemma 2 depends on the first-order conditions of the maximization problem. Note that the cross derivative term, and hence the indirect effects in the three comparative static theorems that follow are evaluated at the solution to the maximization problem as well.
Lemma 2: V Qα ≥ 0 if A(z) is decreasing (DARA).
Proof: Recall that V Qα = Eu′′(z)z Q z α = -EA(z)u′(z)z Q z α . Now z Q is negative for x ≤ γ(Q) and positive when x > γ(Q). z α , on the other hand, is negative for x > γ(Q) and decreases linearly to the point x = γ(Q). Hence, z α and z Q each change sign one time as x increases, with the sign change for z α occurring first. Case 3 of the proof of Lemma 1 in EMO applies in this particular situation and indicates that V Qα ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
The signs of the components of the numerator of ∂Q * /∂w = (V αw V Qα -V Qw V αα )/ J have now been determined. V αα < 0 from the second order conditions, V Qα ≥ 0 from Lemma 2, and V αw ≥ 0 and V Qw ≤ 0 from Lemma 1. Consequently, a wealth increase directly reduces insurance demand, but indirectly increases demand because more units of the risky asset are held. The relative magnitude of these two effects has not been determined.
In a similar way, ∂α * /∂w, ∂Q * /∂v and ∂α * /∂v are indeterminate in sign because of opposing direct and indirect effects. Theorem 2 shows that even with this indeterminacy, however, we can say that for wealth changes, at least one of the two indirect effects must be dominated by the corresponding direct effect. Since the proof is virtually identical to that in EMO, it is omitted here.
Theorem 2: Either ∂Q*/∂w ≤ 0 or ∂α*/∂w ≥ 0 or both if A(z) is decreasing.
Insurance demand models indicate that under DARA, increases in wealth lead to less insurance demanded, and portfolio models predict that increases in wealth lead to holding more of the risky asset. This theorem confirms that at least one of these two statements holds even when the indirect effects are considered. It is important to emphasize, however, that it is possible for both the quantity of the risky asset and insurance to increase with increases in wealth when indirect effects are taken into account. When this is the case, the effect of an increase in the price of the risky asset can be determined as well.
Unambiguous signs for ∂Q*/∂v and ∂α*/∂v result when insurance demand and demand for the risky asset are each positively related to wealth and the decision maker exhibits DARA. In this situation, an increase in the price of the risky asset leads to less of the asset demanded because the substitution and income effect from the price increase are each negative. The quantity of insurance demanded also falls because the income effect is negative, and under DARA the risky asset and insurance are complements.
Theorem 3: ∂Q*/∂v ≤ 0 and ∂α*/∂v ≤ 0 if the risky asset and insurance are each positively related to wealth and A(z) is decreasing.
The impact of changes in the price schedule for deductible insurance are the final comparative static effects determined in this analysis. Because the price schedule is a function rather than a number, it can be changed in more ways than can the single parameters w or v. The approach to this question taken here is similar to the deterministic transformation methodology employed by Meyer and Ormiston (1989) when analyzing the effect of a change in a random variable. In particular, the change from one function to another is parameterized so that standard comparative static techniques can be used.
Let ψ 1 (Q) denote the initial price function or schedule for deductible insurance policies whose expected indemnification is Q, and let ψ 2 (Q) denote the price function after a change has occurred. Define K(Q) by K(Q) = ψ 2 (Q) -ψ 1 (Q), the difference between these two price functions. Consider the price function ψ 1 (Q) + δK(Q), for δ in [0, 1]. When δ = 0, this price function is ψ 1 (Q) and when δ = 1, it is ψ 2 (Q). Consequently, to determine how the optimal Q and α responds as ψ 1 (Q) is replaced by ψ 2 (Q), one can instead determine how Q and α adjust as δ is increased from 0 to 1. This is the procedure followed by Meyer and Ormiston and is also the procedure used here.
When the price of deductible insurance is given by ψ 1 (Q) + δK(Q), final wealth is:
and the consequent first-order conditions for choosing Q and α optimally are:
Now (8) and (9) are Eu′(z)z Q = 0 and Eu′(z)z α = 0 respectively. These first order conditions define the optimal Q and α and depend on the parameter δ. Notationally, the arguments of functions u, ψ 1 , K, and γ and their derivatives have been suppressed to help simplify the expressions.
To determine the direction of the effect on Q* and α* of changing the price function from ψ 1 to ψ 2 is equivalent to determining the sign of:
for all δ in [0, 1]. As before, J > 0, and hence the numerators determines the sign of these expressions. The previous demonstrations that V αα < 0, V QQ < 0, and under DARA, V Qα ≥ 0 hold for the price schedule ψ 1 (Q) + δK(Q). Hence, only the signs of V αδ and V Qδ remain to be determined. The next lemma begins this process for general price increases for insurance.
The expression for V αδ is given by: V αδ = ∂[Eu′(z)z α ]/∂δ = Eu′(z)z αδ +Eu′′(z)z α ⋅z δ . Now z αδ = -K and z δ = -αK, neither of which depend on x and hence can be moved outside the expectation. In addition, u′′(z) = -A(z)⋅u′(z) implying that V αδ can be written as: V αδ = -K⋅Eu′(z) + αK⋅EA(z)u′(z)⋅z α . Now the first term is obviously nonpositive for K ≥ 0. Also, because u′(z)z α has mean zero and changes sign once from positive to negative as x increases and A(z) is increasing in x under DARA, the second expression is non-positive for K ≥ 0 as well. Thus V αδ ≤ 0 when K ≥ 0 and DARA holds. Q.E.D.
We can rewrite V αδ = -K⋅Eu′(z) + αK⋅EA(z)u′(z)⋅z α as V αδ = -K⋅Eu′(z) -αK⋅V αW , allowing the first term to be interpreted as the substitution effect of the price increase and the second as the wealth or income effect. For this price change under DARA, the two effects are in the same direction. This lemma signs the direct effect of an arbitrary price increase for deductible insurance on α . Each are negative assuming DARA. Price schedule increases directly cause less of the risky asset to be held because it is a less desirable investment relative to the riskless asset. Indirectly, holding less of the risky asset combined with complementarity between the asset and insurance, implies less insurance would be demanded as well. To determine the total effect of such a price increase requires consideration of the direct effect on Q * and the indirect effect on α * as well. These effects involve the term V Qδ which unfortunately is more difficult to sign and can be of the opposing sign.
Determining the sign of V Qδ is exactly the same as determining the impact of a price change in the insurance demand model without portfolio considerations. Hence there is some discussion from the literature, although there are very few results because under DARA, increases in the price of insurance cause income and substitution effects which go in opposite directions. Recall that V Q = Eu′(z)z Q and therefore V Qδ = ∂[Eu′(z)z Q ]/∂δ = Eu′(z)z Qδ + Eu′′(z)z Q ⋅z δ . Using z Qδ = -αK′, z δ = -αK and the definition of A(z), this can be written as V Qδ = -αK′⋅Eu′(z) + αK⋅EA(z)u′(z)z Q , or equivalently as V Qδ = -αK′⋅Eu′(z) -αK⋅V Qw .
The first term, -αK′⋅Eu′(z), is the opposite of the sign of K′ and represents the substitution effect of the price change. Changes in K′ indicate how the slope of the insurance price function is altered and as such represents how the marginal cost of insurance changes as price schedule ψ 1 (Q) is replaced with ψ 2 (Q). When the marginal cost of insurance increases, this term is negative indicating that less insurance would be purchased.
The second term, αK⋅EA(z)u′(z)z Q = -αKV Qw represents the impact of the insurance price change through the wealth and hence the risk taking preferences of the decision maker. By Lemma 1, this income effect term is positive under DARA whenever K ≥ 0. Insurance price increases are a decrease in real wealth and hence under DARA, the decision maker acts in a more risk averse fashion by demanding more insurance. Consequently, with regard to V Qδ , the substitution and income effects can go in opposite directions, and do so whenever price increases are accompanied by steeper slopes of the price function.
In addition to opposing income and substitution effects for V Qδ , Lemma 3 tells us that for price increases for insurance with DARA, the direct effect on α and hence the indirect effect on Q are negative. For the corresponding direct effect on Q and indirect effect on α to reinforce this, the sign of V Qδ should also be negative for K ≥ 0 and DARA and this is not true in general because the income effect is positive. Hence comparison of the relative magnitudes of these substitution and income effects is important and is carried out below for proportional pricing of deductible insurance.
Many researchers assume that price for insurance is proportional to expected indemnification, that is, ψ(Q) = (1+λ)Q for some λ > 0. Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995, 175) indicate that even for this special case and with the portfolio held fixed, increasing λ has an indeterminate effect on the optimal level of deductible insurance because the income and substitution effects are in opposite direction. Theorem 4 indicates that the ambiguity is resolved when relative risk aversion of the decision maker is less than or equal to one. R(z) ≤ 1 and proportional pricing are sufficient to determine the effect of an increase in λ. Increases in λ increase both the level of the price of insurance and also the slope of the price schedule, its marginal cost.
Theorem 4: Consider a decision maker for whom A(z) is decreasing and R(z) ≤ 1. If the price of deductible insurance satisfies ψ(Q) = (1 + λ)Q, then an increase in λ causes a decrease in both α and Q. It is also the case that V Qδ ≤ 0.
Proof: With proportional pricing, ψ 1 (Q) = (1+λ 1 )Q, ψ 2 (Q) = (1+λ 2 )Q and K(Q) = (λ 2 -λ 1 )Q. Assume λ 2 > λ 1 to examine the increase in insurance price case. The proportional pricing assumption implies that K′⋅Q = K. Using this, the terms in V Qδ can be combined into a single term. V Qδ = -α(K/Q)[Eu′(z) -EA(z)u′(z)z Q Q] = -α(K/Q)Eu′(z)(1-R(z)z Q Q/z), which is negative as long as (1-R(z)z Q Q/z) ≥ 0 . Now R(z) ≤ 1, so what remains is to show that z Q Q/z ≤ 1 for each value for x. First note that for fixed x, z is concave in Q. This comes from the convexity of price in Q and the fact that γ(Q) is a convex function. Therefore, Taylor's theorem indicates that z(0) ≤ z(Q) + z Q (Q)(0-Q). Now z(0) = w + α(M-x-v) which is assumed to be non-negative. Hence, for all x, z(Q)/Q ≥ z Q and thus, V Qδ ≤ 0. With V αδ ≤ 0 by Lemma 3, it is the case that the direct and indirect effects of increasing λ are to reduce α and Q. Q.E.D.
As indicated in Cheng, Magill, and Shafer (1987) and Hadar and Seo (1990) , relative risk aversion less than or equal to one is a common condition imposed on risk preference in order to obtain comparative static results both in the one riskyone safe asset model and in other models. Hadar and Seo (1993) also require this restriction on relative risk aversion for agents to display a risk averse response of a sensible nature. With relative risk aversion less than or equal to one and proportional pricing, the relative magnitudes of the income and substitution effects can be compared as shown in Theorem 4. In fact, the conclusions of Theorem 4 follow not only under proportional pricing, but whenever K(Q) is convex in Q; that is, when the difference between the new and old price functions is a convex function.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
The model examined in this research extends the findings obtained by Schlesinger (1981) , Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) , Eeckhoudt, Meyer, and Ormiston (1997) , and many others. Two features are important to highlight. First, when price is convex in expected indemnification, the second order sufficiency condition is met and comparative statics proceed without further assumption. Second, when portfolio considerations are taken into account, even assuming DARA, demand for insurance per unit of the risky asset can increase with wealth.
A topic for further research is to determine the changes in the total amount of insurance demanded resulting from various parameter changes. With expected indemnification rather than the deductible level used to measure the quantity of insurance, this question can be addressed since the total level of expected indemnification can be used to measure the total quantity of insurance selected. When portfolio considerations are taken into account, it is possible for parameter changes to cause the decision maker to increase or decrease the amount of insurance demanded per unit of the risky asset and at the same time do the reverse for the total amount of insurance purchased. Consequently, determination of the total effect is an important issue, but beyond the scope of the current paper.
